The effect of unconsciously perceived masked stimuli on the processing of subsequently presented visible stimuli is considered to be a prototypical example of an automatic process because the influence of strategic processing mechanisms can be ruled out. While the direct engagement of strategic processing is very unlikely during conditions of unconscious perception, I will show later in this article that this does not exclude the possibility of indirect modulatory influences of top-down mechanisms on automatic processing. In this article, I will focus upon automatic processes elicited by unconsciously perceived stimuli because in conditions of unconscious perception it can be ensured that processing occurs 'automatically' without any contribution of intended, strategic processes. This does not preclude the possibility that consciously perceived stimuli can also trigger automatic processes (e.g., Hommel, 2000) . However, for consciously perceived stimuli it is difficult to rule out that controlled processes also contribute (see also the classification of semantic priming mechanisms below). 
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In this section, I will give a brief overview of the (masked) semantic priming paradigm and its application to investigate automatic semantic processes before I move on to discuss top-down influences on automatic processing. During the last decades, convincing evidence has been accumulated that the semantic meaning of masked words that cannot be consciously identified is activated and can influence processing of subsequently presented stimuli (semantic priming; for an overview, see Kiefer, 2002a) . While it is well accepted that unconsciously perceived masked stimuli can prime an associated motor response (response priming; see Klotz & Neumann, 1999; Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2003) , it has been questioned that unconsciously perceived masked stimuli are processed also at the level of semantic meaning (Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001) . However, a variety of studies using the semantic priming paradigm, which is not compromised by confounding response priming effects, have reliably shown that semantic meaning is extracted from unconsciously perceived stimuli (e.g., Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; Kiefer, 2002b; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000 ; for semantic priming during the attentional blink, see Rolke, Heil, Streb, & Henninghausen, 2001 ).
Complementary to response priming, the masked semantic priming paradigm is a powerful tool to study the nature of unconscious perception and -as we will see later -to study the modulatory effects on automatic processes for the following reasons: (i) Semantic priming rests on highly overlearned associations between concepts, which have been acquired within a long period of time (Anderson & Bower, 1973) .
Response priming, in contrast, depends on the congruency of stimulus-response (S-R) mappings established within the experiment or on the congruency of actions afforded by the stimulus (see Ansorge, Neumann, Becker, Kälberer, & Cruse, this volume; Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, this volume) . Hence, automatic semantic priming presumably involves relatively hard-wired processing pathways between related concepts.
Response priming, in contrast, is based on response competition evoked by the (in)congruency of S-R mappings between prime and target (Klinger, Burton, & Pitts, 2000) . (ii) Semantic priming differs from response priming with regard to the underlying neural substrate. Semantic priming crucially depends on areas within the inferior and anterior ventro-medial temporal lobe, which belong to the ventral visual pathway (Nobre & McCarthy, 1995) . The ventral pathway has an important role in object identification and conscious vision in general (Milner & Goodale, 1995) . Response priming, in contrast, involves occipito-parietal regions, which belong to the dorsal pathway (Ansorge et al., this volume, Jaśkowski, Skalska, & Verleger, 2003) . The dorsal pathway has been considered to be the neural substrate of unconscious visuo-motor processes subserving motor responses such as grasping movements (Milner & Goodale, 1995) . Given these differences in functional neuroanatomy between semantic priming and response priming, it is of great interest to assess whether unconscious automatic processes underlying both forms of priming are governed by the same set of computational principles (see also the discussion in the final section of this article).
Semantic priming generally refers to the facilitation of a response to a target stimulus (e.g., a word) by a meaningfully related prime stimulus (Neely, 1991) .
In the masked semantic priming procedure, conscious perception of the prime is eliminated by displaying a pattern mask (e.g., a random sequence of letters) before and after the prime (for processes underlying masking, see for instance Scharlau, 2007, in this issue) . Unconscious semantic activation is demonstrated when the masked prime word facilitates the processing of the target stimulus. Semantic priming has been frequently observed in lexical decision tasks in which subjects have to decide whether a target word (e.g., "lemon") is a real word or a pseudoword. Reactions are faster and more accurate if a semantically related prime word (e.g., "sour") precedes the target in comparison to a condition in which an unrelated word (e.g., "house") precedes the target. Two general cognitive mechanisms have been proposed to underlie semantic priming effects: Firstly, unconscious automatic spreading of activation and secondly, conscious strategic semantic processing (Posner & Snyder, 1975) . According to the first cognitive mechanism, semantic priming reflects the automatic spread of activation in semantic networks. The presentation of a prime stimulus is thought to activate the corresponding conceptual representation in a semantic network, and activation spreads to semantically related nodes, hereby increasing their activation level. Hence, if a word denoting a related concept is presented, its recognition is facilitated. According to Posner and Snyder (1975) automatic spread of activation does not depend on capacity-limited attentional processes. In contrast, according to the second class of cognitive mechanisms (strategic semantic processing), semantic priming is the result of controlled attentional processes such as semantic matching or semantic expectation (for an overview, see Neely, 1991) .
By definition, strategic semantic processing depends http://www.ac-psych.org on capacity-limited attentional resources (Posner & Snyder, 1975) .
With visible prime stimuli, both automatic spreading activation and controlled priming processes usually contribute. For strategic semantic processing to occur, subjects must be aware of the presentation of the prime stimulus, semantic priming elicited by unconsciously perceived masked words exclusively arises from automatic spreading activation. Behavioural masked semantic priming effects have been reliably demonstrated in several studies (e.g., Kiefer, 2002b; Kiefer & Brendel, 2006; Marcel, 1983) .
In addition to behavioural methods, semantic processes can also be studied with event-related brain potentials (ERPs), which have the advantage to capture cognitive processes online with a temporal resolution in the range of milliseconds and have been frequently shown to be more sensitive than behavioural measures (for a discussion, see Kiefer & Brendel, 2006) . In ERP research on semantic processing, semantic priming effects are reflected by an amplitude modulation of the N400 ERP component. The N400 is a negative ERP deflection over the centro-parietal scalp, which specifically reflects semantic processing (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980) . Studies using intracranial electrodes have suggested a generator in the anterior fusiform gyrus (Nobre & McCarthy, 1995) . The significance of this brain area for semantic memory processes has also been shown in neuroimaging studies (e.g., Vandenberghe, Price, Wise, Josephs, & Frackowiak, 1996) . The N400 has been shown to be sensitive to semantic deviations with larger amplitudes for semantically incongruent words compared to congruent words at both the sentence (e.g., Friederici, Hahne, & Mecklinger, 1996; Kutas & Hillyard, 1984) and the word level (e.g., Bentin, McCarthy, & Wood, 1985; Kiefer, 2001 Kiefer, , 2005 .
Using semantic priming paradigms, N400 amplitude to targets is attenuated for semantically related word pairs compared to unrelated word pairs, the so called N400 priming effect (e.g., Bentin, McCarthy, & Wood, 1985; Holcomb & Neville, 1990; Kiefer, Weisbrod, Kern, Maier, & Spitzer, 1998) . There is evidence that the N400 potential is reliably modulated by masked words, which were not consciously perceived (Deacon, Hewitt, Chien-Ming, & Nagata, 2000; Kiefer, 2002b; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000) and by words which were not available for report because they are presented during the attentional blink (Luck, Vogel, & Shapiro, 1996; Rolke, Heil, Streb, & Henninghausen, 2001; Vogel, Luck, & Shapiro, 1998) . The results of these recent studies suggest that the N400 modulation also reflects automatic spread of activation.
These findings are in contrast to results from some earlier studies, which suggested that N400 amplitude is exclusively modulated by strategic semantic processing. In fact, there is some evidence that conscious or attentive processing of the prime is a prerequisite for N400 priming effects (for a review, see Deacon & Shelley-Tremblay, 2000) : In an earlier masked priming study by Brown and Hagoort (1993) , N400 priming effects were only obtained for visible, but not for masked primes, although behavioural priming effects were obtained in both conditions. N400 priming effects were found in a dichotic listening task for attended, but not for ignored prime words (Bentin, Kutas, & Hillyard, 1995) . Finally, N400 priming effects were obtained only when an orienting task required semantic processing of the prime, but not when the task asked for visual processing of word features (Chwilla, Brown, & Hagoort, 1995) . Hence, these studies suggest that attentive orientation to the prime is a prerequisite for N400 priming effects to occur.
It has been proposed that masked N400 priming effects strongly depend on the interval between the onset of the prime word and the target (stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA) and that the use of the long SOA of 500 ms in the Brown and Hagoort (1993) study is one possible explanation for their failure to detect masked N400 priming effects (Deacon, Hewitt, Chien-Ming, & Nagata, 2000; Kiefer, 2002b; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000) .
In fact, when varying the SOA systematically, Kiefer and Spitzer (2000) found masked N400 priming ef- Kiefer and Spitzer, 2000) .
fects at an SOA of 67 ms, but not at an SOA of 200 ms.
Unmasked N400 priming effects, in contrast, increased at the longer SOA (see Figure 1 ). This study shows that masked priming on the N400 ERP component can be obtained provided that prime and target stimuli appear in close succession, but decays rapidly within about 200 ms.
In a further study, Kiefer (2002b) took several measures to ensure that behavioural and N400 masked semantic priming effects indeed reflect unconscious automatic processes and are not compromised by conscious prime identification. In the first experiment, masked priming effects were related to recognition accuracy in a masked prime identification test (lexical decision on masked words and pseudowords) using a regression approach similar to that of Greenwald, Draine, and Abrams (1996) . Kiefer (2002b) did not find a positive relation between the magnitude of priming effects and masked prime identification, thus ruling out the possibility that masked priming effects were contaminated by conscious prime identification. In fact, as can be seen in Figure 2 , the correlation was clearly negative for behavioural priming effects suggesting that priming effects were greater the less conscious information could be obtained from the masked words (for a similar effect, see Carr & Dagenbach, 1990) . In the second experiment, it was assessed whether masked stimuli could be recognised at the visual, lexical and semantic level and whether backward priming from the target to the prime had rendered the masked words partially recognisable. For instance, participants could have correctly completed the partially recognized prime word "t_ _ le" ("table") in the context of the semantically related target word "chair". To this end, subjects were required to perform decisions on visual, lexical and semantic features of masked words presented with Table 1 . Kiefer (2002b) . Kiefer, 2002b) . Table 1 ).
Identification measures for the masked stimuli as a function of task and semantic context (standard deviations in parentheses). Table after

Plots of (A) masked behavioral and (B) masked parietal N400 priming effects as a function of the sensitivity measure d' in the masked visibility test. The plots also show the linear regression function (after
Most importantly, performance did not differ depending on whether the context word was related to the prime or not. These results exclude the possibility that backward priming has rendered the masked words partially visible.
clAssicAl And refined THeories of AuToMATiciTy
So far, I have shown that semantic meaning can be extracted from unconsciously perceived masked words in an automatic fashion. In this section, I will review different theories on the nature of automatic processes. Unconscious 'automatic' 1 processes are typically thought to be elicited autonomously and independently of any cognitive resources and intentions (Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) . In classical theories of attentional control and automaticity, automatic processes are considered to be independent of capacity-limited attention in contrast to controlled processes (Posner & Snyder, 1975) : Controlled processes are proposed (i) to depend on capacity-limited attentional resources, (ii) to interfere with other processes, (iii) to be executable only serially, and (iv) to be conscious. In contrast, it is assumed that automatic processes (i) do not depend on capacity-limited attentional resources, (ii) are not prone to interference with other processes, (iii) can work in parallel, and (iv)
are unconscious (for a review, see Neumann, 1984) .
Hence, unlike controlled processes automatic processes are considered to be entirely autonomous from the configuration of the information processing system.
Neumann (1984) questioned these classical defining
criteria of automatic processes. Instead, he proposed that automatic processes depend on a person's current intentions and direction of attention. Furthermore, Neumann (1984) argued that automatic processes are prone to interference from other processes to some extent. Neumann (1984) assumed that the cognitive system has to be configured in a certain way or, as he calls it, "a variety of process parameters have to be specified for automatic processes to occur". In his theory of direct parameter specification (DPS), which aims at explaining unconscious response priming, Neumann (1990) argues that participants' search for information in order to specify free parameters within the currently active intention/action plan. Unconsciously registered information that resembles this searched-for information is selected and processed to specify the free processing parameters. Hence, according to DPS theory, masked response priming effects should depend on participants' current intentions and action plans (for corresponding evidence see below).
The role of attention for eliciting automatic priming processes is also emphasized by Naccache, Blandin, and Dehaene (2002) . They propose that automatic priming depends on a temporal window of attention which is open for a few hundreds of milliseconds when subjects focus their attention on the predicted time point of the appearance of a stimulus. Temporal attention is assumed to amplify the processing of the masked primes even if they are not consciously perceived. This top-down attentional amplification of unconsciously perceived masked primes enhances, in turn, the elicited automatic processes (see also Dehaene & Naccache, 2001 ). Naccache, Blandin, and Dehaene (2002) conclude that the concept of 'automaticity' has to be refined since unconscious, automatic processes appear to be modulated by topdown strategic control (for empirical evidence, see the section below). However, unconscious processing of the prime is automatic inasmuch as it cannot serve as a source of information for determining strategic processing steps (Merikle, Joordens, & Stolz, 1995) .
In line with Neumann (1984) and Naccache, Blandin, and Dehaene (2002) , I assume that attention and intentions configure the cognitive/neural system in a specific way (Kiefer & Brendel, 2006) . As the mask interferes with the processing of the stimulus, a stable activation pattern is never reached even after many processing cycles. Enns and Di Lollo (2000) suggest that in addition to the amount of interference caused by competing stimuli (i.e., masks) attention is a crucial factor for whether or not re-entrant processing leads to a stable activation pattern representing the Kentridge, Heywood, & Weiskrantz, 1999) . Thus, attention and conscious experience are functionally independent to some extent and should not be equated as some authors do (Merikle & Joordens, 1997; Velmans, 1991) . Attention is obviously a prerequisite for conscious perception ; for a discussion also see Kiefer, 2002a) . However, as argued here, allocation of attention might also be necessary for unconscious stimuli to trigger automatic processes.
Top-down ModulATion of AuToMATic processes: A gATing frAMeworK
In this section, I want to expand the notion of a topdown modulation of automatic processes. In particular, I propose that automatic processes, which can be elicited by both consciously and unconsciously perceived stimuli, and controlled processes only acting upon consciously perceived stimuli are modulated by similar top-down influences. However, top-down modulation of processes elicited by consciously and unconsciously perceived stimuli presumably differs with regard to its temporal onset. As suggested by Ansorge and Horstmann (2007) I distinguish between two types of top-down control: preemptive and reactive control. In preemptive control, top-down influences are set up in advance of stimulus presentation.
Preemptive control can be exerted for both conscious and unconscious stimulus presentation. However, only consciously perceived stimuli are susceptible to reactive control in response to ongoing or completed stimulus processing. For that reason, conscious 'strategic' stimulus processing allows for a greater adaptability and flexibility of top-down control than unconscious 'automatic' processing although both forms of processes share basic principles of top-down modulation.
Given that automatic processes depend on the configuration of the cognitive system, one may also speak of "conditional automaticity" (Bargh, 1989; Logan, 1989 ) because automatic processes are not entirely bottom-up and stimulus driven, but are susceptible to top-down modulation.
As outlined in the previous section, refined theories of automaticity suggest that the cognitive system has to be configured in a certain way for automatic processes to occur. The DPS theory (Neumann, 1990) suggests that attention, intentions, and task goals specify the necessary "parameters" within the information processing system so that an unconscious stimulus suffices to specify the remaining "free" parameters and to trigger a prepared response. But how could the "specification of process parameters" be implemented in a more formal, neuronally plausible mechanism? How could the notion of "parameter specification" be re-formulated in a more general way so that this concept is applicable not only to visuo-motor response preparation, but also to other domains such as semantic processing?
In the research on attention, the modulatory influences of attention on sensory processes are frequently assumed to be realised by a gating mechanism which enhances some processes while blocking others (Hamker, 2005) . Attentional control is thought to be exerted by dorsolateral prefrontal areas, which mediate the representation of task-relevant information Similar to the present proposal, Stolz and Besner (1996) modeled within a connectionist network the influence of task sets on (unmasked) semantic priming effects (for the influence of task sets on semantic priming, see also the next section). In their model, a semantic layer is reciprocally connected with a lexical layer. Semantic priming occurs when activity in the semantic layer is fed-back to the lexical layer. They assume that a perceptual task orientation towards the prime (e.g., a letter search) blocks spreading activation from the semantic to the lexical layer hereby reducing or eliminating semantic priming effects.
Gating mechanisms have been originally proposed for explaining effects of attention on the processing of visible stimuli which enter conscious awareness.
However, the gating mechanism could also apply to unconscious perception and automatic processing.
In particular, it can be used to model the modulatory effects of attention, intention and task sets on 'automatic' processes as suggested by refined theories of automaticity. I propose that the configuration of the cognitive system (or parameter setting) by attention, intention, and task sets is achieved by a similar kind of gating mechanism as suggested for conscious perception (see Figure 3 ). This gating mechanism orchestrates the information processing streams in congruency with the current task-representations even when perception is unconscious and processes are automatic.
Unconsciously perceived masked stimuli can only trigger specific automatic processes (e.g., semantic prim- if the gating mechanism emphasizes other processing pathways, unconsciously perceived stimuli will not be able to elicit further 'automatic' processing. In line with the re-defined theories of automaticity described in the previous section, processes elicited by unconsciously perceived stimuli are automatic in the sense that they are not susceptible to top-down modulation or correction once the process has started (reactive control).
Automatic processes can only be influenced by topdown modulation through gating before the process has started (preemptive control): The gating mechanism can configure the system in such a way that unconsciously perceived stimuli can elicit further processing steps in specific brain areas or it can block these proc- Naccache et al., 2002). http://www.ac-psych.org 
Schematic depiction of sample congruent and incongruent trials (a) and response times for the three conditions (b) in Experiment 1 of the Naccache et al. (2002) study. The motor response was congruent when the prime and the target numbers were both either greater than 5 or less than 5; if one was greater than 5 and the other was less than 5, they were incongruent. Response priming effects were only obtained when the target was presented after a fixed time interval (after
evidence for Top-down ModulATion of AuToMATic processes
In the first two studies reviewed in this section, the modulatory influence of temporal attention on automatic processes was investigated. These studies show that allocation of temporal attention is a prerequisite for automatic priming to occur. In all masked priming studies described in the first sec- First of all, attention was only cued to the appearance of the target. As primes and targets were presented in close temporal proximity, the prime also was attended to. However, attention to the prime and to the target is confounded. Therefore, the conclusion that temporal attention enhanced response priming effects by amplifying processing of the masked prime is not warranted, and the alternative interpretation that attentional enhancement of the target is a prerequisite for masked response priming cannot be ruled out. Secondly, Naccache et al. (2002) investigated the effects of temporal attention on response priming. It has been debated in the response priming literature whether masked response priming effects are mainly due to direct motor specifications without mediation through semantic processes (Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001) . For this reason, it is unclear whether the Naccache et al. (2002) results also hold for semantic priming. There is at least some evidence that unconscious behavioural semantic priming does not depend on spatial attention (Fuentes, Carmona, & Agis, 1994) . However, this previous study only assessed behavioural priming, but did not record ERPs, so that it is open whether neurophysiological measures would be more sensitive to detect top-down attentional modulation of unconscious, automatic semantic priming. Kiefer and Brendel (2006) set up a masked semantic priming paradigm, using ERPs to test whether temporal attention to the masked primes modulates behavioural and N400 priming effects. For the masked semantic priming paradigm, we adopted the design from our earlier studies (Kiefer, 2002b; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000) :
Subjects performed lexical decisions on target stimuli (words and pseudowords), which were preceded by briefly presented (33.5 ms) masked prime words, which could not be consciously identified. In order to track the time course of masked priming, the primetarget SOA was either short (67 ms) or long (200 ms).
In the first experiment, a cuing procedure was applied (see of CPI/SOA conditions were presented in a randomized sequence in order to prevent subjects from predicting the occurrence of the prime. Thus, in contrast to the Naccache et al. (2002) study, attention to the masked prime, not attention to the target, was manipulated. A second experiment was set up to control for whether possible interactions between masked priming and CPI did depend on attentional cuing to the prime or were merely the result of the different trial lengths. In this control experiment, the experimental procedure was the same except that participants were instructed to focus on the lexical decision on the target while the cue stimulus was not task-relevant. Analysis of reactions times showed that the manipulation of temporal attention to the prime in the first experiment was successful.
In this experiment, in which the cue was task-relevant, slower reactions to the target in the short CPI condition demonstrated that participants focused attention to the stimulation stream immediately following cue presentation and had to re-allocate attention when the target was presented. In contrast, in the control experiment, in which the cue was task-irrelevant, we did not observe any RT differences as a function of the CPI. Kiefer and Brendel (2006) found that masked N400 priming effects had an earlier onset and were stronger in amplitude when primes were presented within the attended time window (short CPI) and when the primetarget SOA was short (67 ms) compared to the other conditions (Experiment 1). At the long SOA of 200 ms and when the prime was unattended (long CPI), the onset of the masked priming effect was delayed and N400 priming was generally smaller than in the short SOA/short CPI condition (see Figure 6 ). In Experiment 2, when subjects were instructed to focus upon the target, masked N400 priming was generally reduced such that it did not reach statistical significance at all. Taken together, this study provides strong evidence that attention to an unconsciously perceived masked stimulus is a prerequisite for N400 ERP priming effects to occur.
The data therefore support the view that unconsciously perceived masked stimuli require attentional amplification to elicit automatic processes (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Naccache et al. 2002) . It should be noted that in earlier masked priming studies  figure 5.
Temporal sequence of one trial of the temporal cueing procedure. The masked prime word was presented either 200 ms or 800 ms following a cue, which prompted subjects to attend to the stimulation stream (after Kiefer and Brendel, 2006). http://www.ac-psych.org Kiefer, 2002b; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000) , in which masked N400 priming effects were obtained, participants attended to the prime because the prime was presented shortly after the fixation cross and in close temporal proximity to the target. Kiefer and Brendel (2006) were able to identify two important boundary conditions for obtaining reliable N400 priming effects: prime-target SOA and attention to the prime. Whatever the precise semantic process is that is indexed by N400 amplitude modulation, e.g., automatic spread of activation in semantic networks, it also occurs under automatic processing conditions (in addition to strategic processing conditions). However, automatic semantic processing decays fast over time when elicited by masked stimuli and requires temporal attention to the eliciting stimulus.
The boundary conditions for masked N400 priming effects identified in this study may help to reconcile some discrepant findings in the literature regarding the processing nature of the N400. On the one hand, N400 amplitude has been shown to be modulated by unconsciously perceived masked words Kiefer, 2002b; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000) and by words not available for verbal report during the attentional blink (Luck, Vogel, & Shapiro, 1996; Rolke, Heil, Streb, & Henninghausen, 2001; Vogel, Luck, & Shapiro, 1998) , suggesting that the N400 ERP component is sensitive to automatic priming processes. On the other hand, N400 priming effects have only been found for attended, but not for ignored prime words (e.g., Bentin, Kutas, & Hillyard, 1995; Kellenbach & Michie, 1996) . These latter findings have been taken as evidence that the N400 only reflects strategic post-lexical matching processes, but not automatic priming (e.g., automatic spreading of activation). The Kiefer and Brendel (2006) data allows to resolve this discrepancy. The observation of attentional modulation of unconscious masked N400 priming effects demonstrates that also automatic and not only strategic N400 priming requires that participants attend to the prime stimulus.
Automatic priming does not only depend on temporal attention, but also on intentions and task sets, which are active during the presentation of the masked prime.
In line with Rogers and Monsell (1995) , I define task sets as an adaptive configuration of the cognitive system which is necessary to efficiently perform a given task (see also Gilbert & Shallice, 2002) . The concept of a "task set" is related to that of "intention", but is more specific because it refers to the immediate computational consequences of pursuing a current goal during task performance. The concept of "intention" is broader because it additionally includes the conscious representation of the goal and the subjective state of commitment to perform a goal-related action (Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; Goschke, 2002) . 
Attentional modulation of ERP priming effects. Mean voltages from centro-parietal electrodes in the time window (A) of the descending N400 (200-399) and (B) of the N400 peak (400-599 ms) as a function the cue prime interval (CPI) and prime-target SOA (Experiment 1)
. Voltages were collapsed across electrode sites. In both time windows N400 priming effects were largest at the short CPI/short SOA condition demonstrating an attentional modulation of masked semantic priming (after Kiefer and Brendel, 2006) .
where changed in such a way that primes ceased to be task-relevant, priming effects were abolished. For instance, black-coloured primes elicited a response congruency effect on reactions to the target if the target was also shown in black colour. In contrast, when participants had to respond to red-coloured targets, black-coloured primes did not influence reaction times to the target anymore. In line with the DPS theory, Ansorge and Neumann (2005) argue that masked response priming effects depend on the formation of action plans: Participants search for information in order to specify free parameters within the currently active intention/action plan. Unconsciously registered information that resembles this searched-for information is selected and processed to specify the free processing parameters. Therefore, unconsciously perceived information will translate into behavioural effects that are absent if the same information is sufficiently dissimilar from the searched-for features. As the action plan has to be set up in advance of masked stimulus presentation, this situation is an instance of an exertion of preemptive control. Similar to Ansorge and colleagues, Eckstein and Perrig (2007) , found masked response priming effects in semantic classification tasks only for word categories that matched participants' current classification intention (e.g., living vs. non-living), but not for categories, which were irrelevant to their current classification intention (e.g., pleasant vs. unpleasant).
In a related line of research, Kunde, Kiesel and Hoffmann (2003) investigated under which conditions novel masked primes, which do not belong to the target set, elicit response priming effects. As novel masked primes were never responded to during the course of the experiment, they cannot trigger a response based on simple S-R associations. Kunde et al. (2003) therefore assume that novel masked primes only elicit response priming effects when they are implicitly expected as release condition for a response ("action triggers"). In Experiment 1, novel masked primes were numerically embedded by the consciously presented target numbers (e.g., the primes 2 and 3 in the context of the targets 1 and 4) and thus implicitly expected as potential action triggers. In this experiment, reliable response priming effects were obtained for primes from the target set and also for novel primes. In Experiment 2, in contrast, novel prime numbers were not embedded by the target numbers (e.g., the primes 1 and 2 in the context of the targets 3 and 4) and were consequently not expected as action release conditions. In line with their assumptions, Kunde et al. (2003) observed response priming only for primes from the target set, but not for novel primes.
The effects of intention and expectancy on masked (Chiappe, Smith, & Besner, 1996; Mari-Beffa, Valdes, Cullen, Catena, & Houghton, 2005) . Some studies even found semantic negative priming (e.g., Mari-Beffa, Houghton, Estevez, & Fuentes, 2000) . These results are in line with the assumption of the gating framework proposed here:
Task sets evoke a gating mechanism that enhances and blocks processing pathways, thereby optimizing taskrelated information processing.
It remains an open question whether such effects of task sets generalize to priming from unconsciously perceived masked words. With masked priming, the modulation of automatic semantic processing can be studied without any contamination by strategic mechanisms. In order to address this question, Kiefer (2006) modified the attentional cuing paradigm described above showed that activated task sets persist for a longer time interval (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Meiran, 2000) and can even mediate unconscious response priming effects in the presence of a dominant competing task set (Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2007a) . For that reason, it was assumed that the task set, which is induced by Moreover, automatic processes triggered by consciously perceived stimuli also seem to be modulated top-down: Interference effects which depend on the suppression of automated response tendencies such as the Stroop (Allport et al., 1994) or Simon effects (Hommel, 1993) vary as a function of participants'
intentions. On the other hand, top-down mechanisms might differ for conscious and unconscious stimulus presentations. As described above, conscious stimulus presentation allows for both preemptive and reactive control of stimulus processing whereas during unconscious stimulus presentation only preemptive control can be exerted. It should be noted, however, that it might be difficult to assess automatic processes in isolation by using consciously perceived stimuli. With consciously perceived stimuli a co-occurrence of both, automatic and strategic processes is probably the rule (Koivisto, 1998) rather than the exception (for a similar argument, see Jacoby, 1991) . 
